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BOOK REVIEWS

Legal Effects of Fluctuating Exchange Rates
By Sir Joseph Gold. Washington, D.C,.: International Monetary Fund, 1990,
pp. xviii, 473, $37.50.
A new book by Sir Joseph is always a treat, and this one is no exception. As
the title makes clear, the book is about the effects of the current floating exchange
rate system, rather than the system itself-but one learns much about the latter
as well. The system itself is characterized by instability:
For the purpose of this monograph, the fluctuation of exchange rates means all the
movements in exchange rates that are possible under the exchange arrangements in
force in the (current] discretionary system. A characteristic of such a system is that it
makes predictability of exchange rate behavior extremely difficult. This difficulty generates problems for parties engaged in international payments. They have to be aware
that wide and erratic variations can take place in the exchange rates that affect their
costs, revenues, and profit margins. (p. 31)
And again, in conclusion, the author states (p. 425): "[a]s there is now no
anchor in the international monetary system for the exchange rates of all currencies, as there was in the par value system, there is no unit of account that is
in general use by governments or other parties."
The book extensively discusses the many consequences of this situation, both
at the public and the private law levels. It deals with how public institutionssuch as the IMF, the IBRD, or for example, the parties to the International
Natural Rubber Agreement (p. 101)-and private parties seek to cope with the
realities of the current system.
Public and private parties need a unit of account or numeraire to measure
contributions, disbursements, repayments, and the like. In this connection Sir
Joseph makes a good deal of both the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and
the European Community's European Currency Unit (ECU). The author acknowledges that the SDR is not favored in private transactions. He suggests the
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opposite with respect to the ECU, yet also acknowledges that "[n]umerous
critics argue that the success of the ECU as a private unit has been exaggerated
and is disappointing so far." (p. 89, n.5) Private law is profoundly affected by
the many situations where parties have to deal (or litigate) in more than one
currency, and by the fluctuations in the relationship, that is the rate, between
them. Examples abound: normal commercial contracts; possible corporate charters stated in more than one currency (p. 278); rights of bankruptcy creditors of
different nationality (pp. 206 et seq.); Securities and Exchange Commission
"convenience translation" rules with respect to the foreign currency books and
accounts of foreign issuers; and court judgments in cases involving currencies
foreign to that of the court.
In the past gold may have solved or cushioned currency fluctuations. This is
less and less the case. The author notes the "many [manifestations] in the
Articles [of Agreement of the IMF], of the determination of members to reduce
the role of gold in the international monetary system." (p. 9) And, again, "another major development has been change in the definition of the SDR by
substituting reference to a basket of prescribed amounts of specified currencies
for reference to gold." (p. 406) In addition to continued references to the SDR
and ECU, the reader learns of other units of account replacing gold. Such units
include the "Malaysian/Singapore cent," defined as "the average of the Malaysian sen and the Singapore cent at the prevailing rates of exchange" (p. 101),
and the "gaucho," a common currency unit announced by Brazil and Argentina
in 1987 to be used in bilateral trade between these countries (p. 101, n. 2). The
role of the U.S. dollar remains great: as in the reduction of the "headroom" or
capacity to make loans of the IBRD, whose capital is expressed in U.S. dollars
whereas many of its loans are made in other currencies whose values have
appreciated against the dollar (p. 107); or in cases where a court or international
organization refuses to use the SDR instead of the dollar to fix liabilities or rates
(for example, TransworldAirlines, Inc. v. FranklinMint Corp.' (p. 115) and the
International Telecommunications Regulations of the ITU (pp. 118 et seq.)). It is
not clear whether the author's view of the dollar is grudging, wistful or what:
The explanation of the role of the U.S. dollar in international monetary matters and in the
multitudinous public and private activities in which it serves as the unit of account is not
that the dollar has a stable exchange value. The explanation is the power of the United
States in the world economy and the strength and breadth of its financial and exchange
markets, as well as the stability of its political system. This power gives the United States
a de facto veto in much of the business of international organizations even when it has no
de jure veto. It is power that should be exercised with maximum wisdom and with maximum concern for fairness in international and national monetary law. (p. 428)
There are splendid tidbits in the book. The reader learns that a meeting of the
parties to the International Natural Rubber Agreement must be convened upon a
"significant change" in the relationship between the currencies of the major
1. 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
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natural rubber exporters/importers and the "Malaysian/Singapore cent." (p. 133)
The author also explains that
an agreement took effect on January 1, 1973 among 18 countries that belonged to the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), under which each
country guaranteed for a period of three years the exchange value of working balances
in its currency held by the central banks of the other parties. (p. 138)
And at another point the author notes the "archaic distinction between the
delayed payment of a debt and the delayed payment of damages for breach of
contract." (p. 206)
The more practical effects of fluctuating rates may be put in four groups: rates,
maintenance of value, contract law problems, and court remedies associated with
the celebrated British case, Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd.2
Rates
Frequent questions include the method by which rates are set and the freedom
of parties to set them. In Presidentof India v. Lips Maritime Corp.,3 Clause 30
of a charterparty provided that freight and demurrage were to be calculated in
U.S. dollars but paid in pounds sterling at the exchange rate "ruling on the date
of the bills of lading." (p. 203) On that date the rate was 2.37 dollars to the
pound; because of the delay in discharge of the cargo, by the time the resulting
dispute was settled the rate was 1.54 dollars to the pound. The House of Lord
reversed an award to the shipowner for special damages of 5,514 pounds, holding there was no such thing in English law as a cause of action in damages for
the late payment of damages. (p. 205)
Parties may control outcomes. The English Law Commission has:
concluded that parties were free, and should continue to be free, to agree that the
translation of any currency into another currency that becomes necessary in their
dealings shall be made at the exchange rate prevailing on a particular date or to name
the exchange rate that is to be applied. (p. 156)
Maintenance of Value
Explicit clauses that allocate the risk arising from a change in a currency are
common in contracts and loan agreements. Thus, the old gold clauses fixed the
obligation of a loan borrower in gold notwithstanding that the borrowed currency
might have depreciated. There are equivalent clauses today, but with reference to
a currency or unit of account (for example, the ECU) other than gold. The author
points out that there is no customary international law obligation; thus, in the
absence of an explicit agreement such as the aforementioned 1973 OECD agreement, a government has no liability for a decline in the value of its currency held

2. [1975] 1 All E.R. 1076; [1975] 3 All E.R. 801; 1976 A.C. 443.
3. [197813 All E.R. 110.
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by another government. The IMF Articles of Agreement do not impose a maintenance of value obligation. However, the more recent charters of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) fix government payment obligations at a
higher level than a decline in the value of their currencies might yield. (p. 139)
The Law of Contracts
The author discusses a number of interesting matters including hardship clauses
(which raise the question of whether a contract should be adapted even where there
is no maintenance of value obligation and an explicit escalation clause does not
do the job), impracticability (p. 233), unconscionability (p. 236), and unforeseeability. Courts doubt that currency changes can amount to impracticability or
unconscionability (p. 236), and "[t]he role of foreseeability in connection with
various judicial doctrines has not been fully worked out." (p. 422)
The case of W Bruns & Company of Hamburg v. StandardFruit and Steamship Company of New Orleans(The Brunsrode)4 brings out the issue of hardship.
A German owner chartered a ship to a U.S. charterer at 23.5 U.S. cents per bale
cubic foot per thirty days. The shipowner required the charterer to make monthly
payments in advance. The charter party provided that the charter rate would be
changed to reflect changes under the owner's crew agreement. The owner paid
his crew in deutsche marks that began to rise. The changes in the amounts to be
paid the crew were made yearly. The U.S. charterer maintained that the deutsche
mark-dollar rate prevailing on the day of the annual crew agreement change
should then be applied for the following year; the German owner wished to make
this adjustment each month as the deutsche mark rose against the dollar. The
English court deciding the case (although neither of the currencies involved were
pounds sterling) would not do so.
Miliangos
Much has already been written about breach, payment and judgment dates,
and Miliangos. Sir Joseph discusses the development of the Miliangos doctrine
(that is, that a court may award damages in the currency of the underlying
contract or other transaction) in the United Kingdom and many other jurisdictions including the United States, which has still not accepted the doctrine of
Miliangos. In this connection Sir Joseph discusses the Uniform Foreign-Money
Claims Act, which he believes to be meticulous and admirable, which allows for
the Miliangos rule if a statute so provides. (p. 356) Such has been done in New
York (p. 335). The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law is criticized for stating
that U.S. law, without statute, is amenable to Miliangos, which neither Sir
Joseph, nor this reviewer, believes to be the case. (p. 332)
4. [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 501.
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I recommend the reading-either in whole or in pieces-of this book to
specialist and nonspecialist alike. For the latter, at least, I do so on two counts:
as ao introduction to Joe Gold and his style and as an introduction into the world
that Sir Joseph knows so well. The text and allusions in the book will open up
the universe of law and money to the reader.
Don Wallace, Jr., Chairman
International Law Institute
and Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center
International Counsel
Shearman & Sterling, Washington, D.C.

Making Global Deals: Negotiating

in the International Marketplace
By Jeswald W. Salacuse. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991, pp. 185,
$19.95.
A country's economic competitiveness abroad faces many obstacles: protectionism
in foreign markets, unfair trade practices by other nations, failures in international
cooperation, and inadequacies in its domestic educational system. While these factors
certainly influence global trade and capital flows, discussions about competitiveness
often neglect the basic molecule of those flows-the international business deal.
Most commentators take international deal making for granted. They apparently
assume that if the right policies and structures are in place, business among nations will
automatically follow. Experience clearly shows, however, that negotiating an international business transaction is a difficult, painstaking process that can fail even in the
presence of the most favorable policies and institutions. The difference between failure
and success often resides in the ability and knowledge of the persons at the negotiating
table. If a nation is to become more competitive internationally, a broad segment of its
business community needs to be skilled at international deal making. My purpose of
this book is to provide business executives, lawyers, and government officials with
useful advice on international business negotiation. (Preface)
These are the opening remarks of Dean Salacuse's recent book, Making Global Deals. He achieves his purpose.
This book contains a concise, simple statement of how to negotiate contracts
in the international market place. Easy to read, the book divides the global deal
into seven basic elements, each of which can be thought of as a barrier to a
successful negotiation of an international transaction. The seven barriers are:
(1) negotiating environments;
(2) cultures;
(3) ideologies;
(4) foreign bureaucracies and organizations;
FALL 1992
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(5) foreign laws and governments;
(6) multiple monies; and
(7) instability and sudden change.
These seven barriers are best summarized by using Dean Salacuse's own
words found in the first chapter:
What are the barriers to a global deal?
The first, and perhaps most obvious, barrier is the negotiating environment. The
parties are usually located at a great distance from one another. Even in this age of
instant global communication and high-speed travel, distance still complicates planning
and executing negotiations. One side usually has to travel to the other side's turf to
negotiate. For the visitor, that turf is a foreign environment, and that "foreigness"is a
potential barrier to deal making.
Culture is a second barrier to making global deals. International business transactions
not only cross national boundaries, they also cross cultures. Culture is a powerful factor
shaping how people think, communicate, and behave. It also affects their style of
negotiation. The cultural differences between a Chinese public sector plant manager in
Shanghai and an American division head of a family company in Cleveland can create
a negotiating barrier that in the end will block any deal.
Whether they are Democrats or Republicans, American business executives generally share a common ideology. But in the international arena, business negotiators
encounter-and must be prepared to deal with-ideologies vastly different from their
own. Ideology, then, is the third barrier to negotiating global deals.
The fourth barrier to international business negotiations is foreign bureaucracy.
Americans are often unprepared for the extensive influence exerted by foreign governments on business activities. Effective international negotiators must know how to deal
with a wide variety of foreign organizations, both public and private.
By engaging in international business, a company enters into a world of many
different laws and political systems. Foreign laws and governments are a fifth barrier to
negotiation. An export sale, a direct foreign investment, or a technology transfer brings
at least one of the parties to the deal into contact with the laws and government of
another country. Not only are these foreign laws and governments largely unknown to
visiting global deal makers, but they must also figure out how to cope simultaneously
with their own laws and government at home. Failure to overcome this barrier may
mean that project income will be taxed by two or more governments, a contract may be
governed by two or more legal systems, and a dispute between the parties will be
decided by two or more courts-in two or more different ways.
Unlike purely domestic deals, international transactions take place in a world of
many currencies and monetary systems. Global deals cross monetary boundaries just as
they cross political, cultural, and ideological lines. Multiple money, the sixth barrier to
a global deal, is always present in negotiation, and it has proved to be insurmountable
on numerous occasions.
The seventh and final barrier to global deal making is the risk of instability and
sudden change so common to the international system itself. Change, of course, is a
fact of life, and sudden changes in circumstances are to be found in both domestic and
international business. Still, the type and magnitude of change in the international arena
appears far greater than in the U.S. domestic setting. The fall of the Shah of Iran, the
opening of the Berlin Wall, and the closing of the Suez Canal are just a few examples
of events that had wide and serious consequences for international business deals.
(pp. 5-6)

VOL. 26, NO. 3

BOOK REVIEWS

839

Many of Dean Salacuse's observations are obvious and practical. Other are
more erudite. Yet it is not the specifics of the book that are impressive. Rather
it is Dean Salacuse's organizational skills and simplistic style that makes the
book valuable. Where else can one find an easy-to-access outline of virtually
every key element of an international transaction?
My only criticism of this book is that sometimes its approach is too simplistic.
Although my experience is limited in the international arena, what experience I
do have indicates that issues of authority, payment, and assurance of performance
are the main impediments to the consummation of foreign transactions. In this
regard, it is not unusual to find all three issues in an international negotiation.
These three issues can be summarized in the following manner:
" Authority typically means not only a license or similar piece of paper issued
by a governmental body, but also proof of that governmental body's authority. Many times it is not as difficult to obtain a license as it is to obtain
assurances that the body issuing the license has the authority over the
subject matter of the license.
* Issues of payment typically involve exchange rate risks. Other than the issue
of authority, this issue predominates virtually every international transaction. No one wants to be left holding a bag of nonexchangeable currency or
having to take a major risk of converting this currency to something of
value.
" Assurance of performance typically means some sort of enhancement by a
third party in the form of guarantees, letters of credit, or the like. Intermediaries such as the World Bank are important players in this arena of international negotiations.
I would have appreciated more focus by Dean Salacuse on these three issues,
including a listing of source materials. Although these issues are covered, the
coverage is too superficial considering their importance. Hence, I find the book
incomplete and in need of a supplement with respect to these matters.
I would also have appreciated some opening remarks by Dean Salacuse on the
future of global deal making. Dean Salacuse's book presents the classical picture
of spirited negotiations between two parties of different nationalities with adverse interests. The book also presents the potential of government intervention,
which could be detrimental to the negotiated deal. In my opinion, the book
focuses too much on this adversarial interest.
With big businesses getting bigger and more international in scope, must not
these barriers of separation ultimately fall? In a world shrunk by jet airliner, the
fax, the computer, and television, will not alignment of multinational interests
become more the rule, rather than the exception? Certainly, this seems to be the
trend as we in the United States witness the European economic government and
the development of U.S.-Mexico trade relations. It would have been helpful to
have Dean Salacuse's views on these current developments.

FALL 1992
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Nevertheless, overall I recommend this book to anyone commencing negotiations of an international transaction, no matter whether the perspective is that of
the United States interest or an interest from another country. The following
words of advice alone make the book worth its price: "To communicate effectively, skilled negotiators must constantly and simultaneously be aware of three
things throughout a negotiation: their own words and actions; the meaning that
the other side gives to those words and actions; and the words and actions of the
other side." (p. 43)
William B. Sechrest
Shareholder
Winstead Sechrest & Minick
Dallas, Texas

International Securities Regulation: London's
"Big Bang" and the European Securities Markets
By Norman S. Poser. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1990, pp.
approx. 850, $125.00.
To the long list of books analyzing London's "Big Bang" and the subsequent
regulatory evolution, add Professor Norman Poser's book, InternationalSecurities Regulation. 1 Add it, however, with a star because Poser writes from a unique
and uniquely applicable perspective and draws from an impressive pool of
sources. This, coupled with the successful efforts of the book's publisher to
place the book in the hands of the public while its subject matter is still relatively
current, results in a thoroughly worthwhile addition.
Having worked for the Securities and Exchange Commission and later for the
American Stock Exchange during the years of financial market deregulation in
the United States, Poser occupied a particularly good vantage point from which
to observe the forces and consequences surrounding that deregulation. Those
events were very similar to those that occurred and are still occurring in London's financial markets. This is the unique perspective that Poser offers in his
preface and that is evident in the main text. This perspective, coupled with his
access to the primary architects of the "Big Bang" as sources for his text, has
produced by way of synthesis a highly informative study.
Of note is the fact that, without question, the book's title exceeds the scope of
the text. The book's subtitle, London's "Big Bang" and the European Securities

1. Norman S. Poser is a Professor of Law at the Brooklyn Law School.
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Markets is perhaps, like those of the Gilbert and Sullivan operas, 2 more revealing. Professor Poser more accurately describes his work's scope in its preface.
Poser characterizes his book not as a "hornbook of British securities law," much
less international securities law, but, instead, as an "interesting and helpful study
of London's 'City Revolution' to be used by practitioners and policymakers in
the financial and legal fields. Poser delivers a solid account of the evolution and
current state of London's financial markets' regulatory structure, discusses pending issues regarding the regulatory structure vis-A-vis EEC directives and policy,
and concludes with brief descriptions of other European financial markets. The
book's core is a description of and commentary on the Financial Services Act
1986 and its continuing evolution.
The first eighty pages of the book trace the series of events that led to the
deregulation of London's financial markets, which came to be known as the
"Big Bang." The examination identifies the forces-global and domestic-to
which the deregulation was a response and briefly evaluates the effectiveness of
that deregulation. Poser discusses the appearance in London during the 1970s of
large foreign investment firms participating in the rapidly expanding Eurobond
Market, and the threat that they posed to the then highly insulated and regulated
London Stock Exchange. The author examines the need for U.K. investment
firms to increase their capitalization in order to handle adequately the sharp
increase in large institutional transactions. Poser also explores the internal pressures for change to a more open and internationally attractive market, as manifested by the legislative withdrawal of protection from antitrust-type liability
that had been integral to the rules of the London Stock Exchange. Poser then
addresses the main elements of deregulation, concentrating on the three most
prominent: the elimination of fixed commissions; the broadening of access to
Stock Exchange membership; and the adoption of the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation System (SEAQ) in place of the single-capacity system of jobbers and brokers.
The next 261 pages of Poser's text are dedicated to an analysis of the regulatory structure created by the Financial Services Act 1986 (FSA). After a brief
history of the Act's naissance and a very general description of the regulatory
structure the Act created, Poser methodically dissects the Act's more significant
provisions and concepts: self-regulation, the nature of the Securities and Investments Board (SIB), authorization, and investments and "investment business,"
to name just a few. He next focuses on the progeny of the FSA: The regulation
of conduct of business as prescribed in the SIB's 1987 Rules; the "equivalence
test"; the SIB's "New Approach" and key principles therein; and the regulation
of insider trading and, to a limited extent, takeovers.
Within this section is thorough and noteworthy discussion of the difficulties of
regulating conflicts of interest and the effectiveness of implementing "Chinese
2. Most of the Savoy operas have subtitles, such as Ruddigore or "the Witch's Curse."
FALL 1992
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Walls" to prevent these conflicts. Abandonment of London's traditional singlecapacity system in favor of multifunction investment conglomerates meant that it
became possible for two broad categories of conflict of interest to arise. The first
occurs when a firm is acting in the market both on its own behalf and on behalf
of its client. If the firm's actions on its own behalf benefit the firm to its client's
detriment, the firm may be found in breach of the fiduciary duty it owes to its
client. This situation would occur, for example, when the firm's retail department is recommending purchase of a security at the same time as the firm's
treasury department, with a different research base, is selling on its own account.
Had the client the benefit of the firm's cumulative opinion of the security, the
client would not buy the security.
The second and perhaps more surreptitious type of conflict arises in the "twoclient" form. Here the tension is between common law principles of agency law
and restrictions on the use of material, nonpublic information. Agency law
dictates that an agent has a fiduciary duty to act in its principal's best interest and
that the knowledge of an agent is imputed to its principal. Thus, if the investment
banking department of an investment firm deals with a public company, and a
private client makes an investment in this company, the broker advising the
private client, as agent for the private client, is bound by fiduciary duty to use all
of the firm's information in advising the private client. The knowledge of the
investment banking department is imputed to the entire firm by virtue of the
investment banking department's agency-principal relationship with the firm as
a whole. The broker is then between two fires: that of fiduciary duty to this client
and the risk of insider dealing difficulties involved in using material, nonpublic
information as a basis for investment decisions. Some, but not all, of these
dangers can be eliminated by an appropriate contract; however, a contract can
rarely provide a defense against criminal prosecution in this area.
A Chinese Wall is a corporate policy prohibiting communication of nonessential information between the various departments of an investment firm. In using
a Chinese Wall, a corporation hopes to decrease the availability of insider information to parties not requiring access and thus to prevent the opportunity for
information misuse. The core issue in respect of Chinese Walls (not yet tested in
the U.K. courts) is the extent to which their use may be asserted as a legal
defense both to charges of insider trading by prosecutors and to charges of breach
of fiduciary duty by clients harmed by not having access to all the firm's information.
In the United States, where the concept of Chinese Wall was developed, its
value is chiefly prophylactic. Existence of a Chinese Wall may be asserted as a
defense only in limited situations, such as SEC rule 14e-3 regarding tender
offers (which provides protection against SEC action for deals done on a client's
behalf but not for principal deals). The underlying philosophy is that a firm,
aware of its duty, knowingly enters into a conflict of interest by accepting an
investment banking role for a company in whose security it already trades. Then,
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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if the firm does not curtail its trading activity in that security for the duration of
its investment banking relationship and does not disclose to its retail client that
it may acquire material information that it would not be able to communicate to
the client in giving investment advice, the firm is taken, in the U.S. jurisdiction,
to have chosen to leave itself vulnerable to claims of conflict of interest.
In the United Kingdom, while there is as yet no leading judicial decision on
the subject, the availability of a Chinese Wall legal defense may be considerably
greater. The Financial Services Act 1986 was initially interpreted by practitioners
as recognizing a Chinese Wall legal defense for alleged violations of the Act's
key antifraud provision and of rules adopted under the authority of the Act.
However, doubt remained as to its effectiveness as a defense to claims for breach
of fiduciary duty. Since the publication of Poser's book, the debate has moved to
new territory with the SIB's Core Rule 36 on Chinese Walls and with an as yet
incomplete review of the interlock by the English and Scottish Law Commissions. This review takes place at a time when the English judiciary has shown,
in some leading decisions, considerable distrust of the practical effectiveness of
Chinese Walls in large solicitors' firms.
Poser summarizes his valuable, but now necessarily incomplete, section by
discussing the effectiveness of and problems with the Chinese Wall solution to
conflicts of interest. No matter how high Chinese Walls are built in the corporate
structure, sensitive information will almost always reach an individual with, at
least, supervisory involvement in both the segment of the firm having the information and the segment of the firm from which the information should be kept.
The predictability of human nature at that point, with the stakes as high as they
tend to be, is reflected in the wariness with which leading members of the
financial industry regard Chinese Walls. A high degree of internal segmentation
by Chinese Walls would undercut the expected synergy that motivated the creation of multifunction investment conglomerates. Less comprehensive Chinese
Walls risk not affording the private investor adequate protection. So "too much"
and "too little" may be close neighbors, or may even overlap.
Poser's analysis points out the truth of the proposition that regulation, as yet
incomplete, of conflicts of interest must find some compromise between efficiency and fairness, economic growth and abuse. Many economists say efficiency and market forces should be self-regulating. Lawyers and judges lean
towards the fairness with which the common law agency principles are imbued.
Total segregation-one broker for each investor-while fair, is obviously not
feasible. Total abandonment of any concept of confidence would be as indefensible in the opposite direction. There has to be some middle ground.
The book's final section deals with the rest of the European Community (EC)
and the nature of the relatively small financial markets in other European countries. Poser describes the EC goal of market integration within the Community
and its implications for London's current status as a premier international financial market. By way of illustration, Poser highlights six European Commission
FALL 1992
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directives relevant to financial markets in terms of their potential effect on
London's continuing attractiveness. Through this method, Poser shows the dilemma that the United Kingdom is experiencing as a result of its desire to
participate as a member of the EC without sacrificing the advantage of its
financial markets' current position. He infers, with some sense of worry, that the
intended effects of deregulation and the Financial Services Act 1986 may be lost
after a relatively short period. The section ends with several summaries of the
financial market structure of five other EC Member States (France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain) and two other European countries (Switzerland
and Sweden). Poser excludes from the analyses the other Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal). This exclusion
occasions little surprise except perhaps in the case of Luxembourg, whose specialty in terms of European mutual funds in undoubtedly significant.
Finally, Poser supplements his book with generous appendices: an extensive
bibliography; tables of U.K., U.S., and EC statutes, rules, and directives; a table
of the cases mentioned in the text; an adequate glossary; and a complete copy of
the Financial Services Act 1986, which alone accounts for 302 of the book's 799
pages.
The truly outstanding features of this work are its thoroughness and clarity.
Professor Poser constructs a broad foundation on which to build an expansive
understanding of the nature of London's financial markets' regulatory structure.
Where helpful, he compares and contrasts the FSA's provisions with the corresponding provisions in U.S. securities law. And, where available, Poser identifies pivotal issues regarding legal questions about a given provision. Poser accomplishes this by citing seminal cases or policy statements by regulatory bodies
dependably listed in the footnotes. Additionally, the book was published before
its text became significantly dated, which is no easy task considering the rapid
and ongoing evolution and continual honing of financial regulation in London.
If any criticism is to be made about this book, it is that Poser did not narrow
his focus. A more limited number of aspects of the subject, explored from his
unique perspective, might have repaid deeper and more extended analysis. Perhaps Poser left such an approach for his next book. Or perhaps, one may hope
for more specific illumination of some of the points Poser makes from a forthcoming book on a similar subject matter, already foreshadowed in the International Tax and Business Lawyer:3 Professor James J. Fishman's The Transformation of Threadneedle Street: The Deregulation and Reregulation of Britain's
Financial Services. Carolina Academic Press will publish Fishman's text in
1992.
In short, Poser presents a valuable and thought-provoking book mainly about
the United Kingdom as seen from a privileged U.S. standpoint. International
3. See James J. Fishman, Enforcement of Securities Laws Violation in the United Kingdom, 9
INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 131 (1991). Like Professor Poser, Professor Fishman has connections with

the Brooklyn Law School.
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Securities Regulation:London's "Big Bang" and the European Securities Markets should be valuable reading to practitioners and interested observers of international finance.
Michael Blair*
General Counsel
Securities and Investments Board
London

International Mergers: The Antitrust Process
By J. W. Rowley & D. I. Baker. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991, pp. xlix,
£150.00, $277.00 (approx.).
There was a time when books on comparative law were almost exclusively of
interest to legal scholars rather than practitioners. This was true especially in
regard to comparative antitrust law treatises, not only because very few transactions were challenged in more than one jurisdiction, but also because very few
foreign nations had effective systems of enforcement. That we have entered a
new era is made clear by the publication of the superb survey on antitrust merger
control by Rowley and Baker. The book will certainly be of use and interest to
comparative law scholars; it is an absolute necessity for lawyers giving antitrust
advice to foreign or multinational clients involved in transnational mergers or
acquisitions.
The United States has had an antitrust merger law dealing with mergers since
1950; Japan since 1953. Nevertheless, the development of modem, full-scale
merger control did not really take off until the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
(HSR) bill in the United States in 1976. Before that, the U.S. Justice Department
and Federal Trade Commission usually learned about mergers from newspaper
reports and often had to try to undo them long after the assets had been intermixed.
The HSR scheme has five major elements: (1) a statutory standard for judging
the legality of mergers; (2) a requirement of notification, combined with size and
other jurisdictional criteria; (3) a description of what basic information must be
submitted initially and an authorization for the enforcement agency to issue a
further demand (second request) for additional information; (4) a rule that the
transaction cannot be completed until the enforcement agency has received all
the information it is entitled to and has had time to consider the transaction's

*This review is written in a personal capacity and must not be taken to be expressing the views of
the Securities and Investments Board. The author would like to acknowledge the help of Michael
Pisani, a law student at Pepperdine University, in the preparation of this review.
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merits; and (5) a set of prompt, inflexible time limits (months not years) within
which the agency must challenge the transaction, negotiate about it, or allow it
to proceed.
The successful application of the HSR process to domestic and transnational
mergers made it clear that the United States was developing an effective, nondiscriminatory system of antitrust merger control under which no significant
transaction would go unreviewed. In 1986, following the U.S. example, Canada
adopted virtually the same system. Even more significant, the European Communities, after having sought authority for merger control since 1973, were
authorized to adopt such a system in late 1989. Germany has had a notification
system in effect for about as long as the United States. The United Kingdom
strengthened its merger control process in 1989 by creating a notification system,
although not a mandatory one.
Now, in the new antitrust world of the 1990s, a merger of two multinational
corporations could conceivably require antitrust merger control notification in
from four to twelve jurisdictions. As a result, a practitioner counseling such a
company could have to coordinate with antitrust counsel in numerous countries
and numerous languages simply to determine where the transaction might be
examined and where filings must or should be made, much less predict its
legality. Fortunately, counsel now have a better alternative: use of the Rowley &
Baker treatise.
The book is divided into ten chapters, devoted to the merger control systems
in the EEC, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, the United States,
Canada, Australia, and Japan. Each chapter is written by an expert local practitioner. Baker is the author of the U.S. chapter, Rowley, author of the Canadian
one. By design, all chapters are organized in the same straightforward logical
manner, covering the statutory standard and filing requirements first, then describing the relevant enforcement agencies, the possibility of private actions, the
adjudicative process, the major decisions, and so on. Each chapter ends with
valuable appendices containing the relevant statutory materials, regulations, and
guidelines (in admirable translations, where necessary). Although at least half
the authors probably do not use English as their first language, the quality of the
prose is uniformly high. Credit must go to Rowley and Baker for their choice of
collaborators, or their editing.
Only an ingrate would criticize a work so well done and so informative, but
a few thoughts concerning how the second edition might be made even more
indispensable seem appropriate. First, the book begins a little abruptly, with only
a two-page preface. The broad subjects covered cry out for a substantial introduction or conclusion that ties the material together, sketches the major trends
and issues, and predicts where the field is going. One nagging question is
whether "public interest" merger control, such as in England and Ireland, can
coexist with pure competition standards, since the former tends to become a form
of protection against foreign ownership, while the latter is neutral in that regard.
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Questions abound also concerning how much cooperation, coordination, and
avoidance of duplication will develop among merger control enforcers in different jurisdictions. The perceptive authors of the EC chapter touch on a few of
these points, but we have no comment from Rowley or Baker or from some
eleventh author assigned to discuss the overall picture.
Lastly are questions of inclusions and exclusions. The authors do not state how
many merger control systems there are in the world, or why they picked these
ten. This reviewer is aware of functioning systems in, for instance, Korea,
Sweden, and Italy, which may well be of greater significance than those in
Ireland and Spain.
No survey is ever perfect. Nevertheless, Rowley's and Baker's is one of the best
new books in the antitrust field in many years and has no present rival. International
lawyers and law firms in all major commercial capitals should own it.
Joel Davidow
Partner, Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, Washington, D.C.
Former Chief, Foreign Commerce Section
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Adjunct Professor (International & Comparative Antitrust Law)
Washington College of Law at American University

International Joint VenturesThe Legal and Tax Issues
Edited by Richard P. Casna and John E. McDermott, Jr. London: Eurostudy
Publishing Company Ltd., 1991, pp. 267, $160.00 (pb).
For decades the U.S. internationally oriented enterprise has been xenophobic:
No foreigners have been included in offshore ventures. Grudgingly, local country
partners might be included for some minority interest participation-if mandated
by local requirements. For several decades after World War 11 the executives of
U.S. international enterprises thought that they had a monopoly on the capable
management of foreign investments. They also sought to protect the technology
(if any) utilized offshore from possible exposure to non-U.S. owners, even those
in minority positions. The decades of the 1970s and, more importantly, the 1980s
sufficiently chastised U.S. businesses so that they must now recognize the absolute necessity of an amalgam of joint venturers having diverse perspectives.
The recent collaboration of IBM and Apple Computer is a poignant domestic
example of this dramatic reversal in attitude. International joint ventures also
increasingly evidence the objective, and necessity, of blending expertise and
technologies from multiple jurisdictions to obtain a competitive advantage.
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An examination of the legal aspects of international joint ventures is always a
frustrating exercise, as is evident from the Casna/McDermott volume. Each time
one seems to have a grasp of the subject matter, another fundamental issue arises.
This dilemma is so pervasive that the definition of an international joint venture
is often elusive. With its release of InternationalJoint Ventures-The Legal and
Tax Issues, Eurostudy Publishing Company makes a further (and largely commendable) effort to grapple with defining international joint ventures and advising about the structuring of these endeavors in the transnational environment.
Eurostudy identifies itself as a publisher for "the international capital and
money markets." It describes this volume as the latest addition to its Money
Manager's Library Series (a series of Special Reports on international business
topics). At the end of this volume it identifies other releases in its Special Report
series that deal with, for example, the corporate management of foreign exchange, interest rate risk management, off-balance sheet financing, and leveraged buyouts.
The material included in this volume represents the proceedings of the International Tax Institute, Inc.'s 28th Annual Seminar in New York City in June
1989, with the papers revised to December 1990. Prominent practitioners in
leading international law firms and international accounting firms delivered these
papers (and the chapters in this volume).
The volume is divided into two primary segments: nontax and tax. One wishes
that better nomenclature could be devised for the nontax portion, but often, the
planning concerning international joint ventures revolves around these two fundamental universes. An identification of the more detailed structure of this volume is appropriate. The nontax segment identifies such issues as: (i) the form,
structure, and location of the international joint venture; (ii) operational problems; (iii) winding up and withdrawal; (iv) trade secrets and other intangible
property; (v) antitrust and competition rules; and (vi) management and accounting considerations. The tax portion examines the national and transnational tax
aspects of joint ventures. The volume addresses this analysis on a territorial
basis: Belgium and the Netherlands, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
A significant part of the nontax segment of these materials is devoted to defining
just what this creature called a "joint venture" is. In the United States this term is
often interpreted as being a partnership (that is, a transparent entity, as defined for
U.S. tax purposes). For many others it might be perceived as consisting of joint
shareholdings in a corporate organization. This confusion is compounded in the
international environment where foreign law introduces other types of business enities that are not precisely parallel with the partnership/corporation dichotomy that
has traditionally existed in the United States. The first part of the volume provides
both a U.K. and a Dutch corporate law perspective to enable a more comprehensive
examination of the available entity structuring alternatives.
The two other major segments of this first part detail the transfer of intangible
property to the joint venture and antitrust issues. In the current environment the
VOL. 26, NO. 3

BOOK REVIEWS

849

U.S. participant's most valuable contribution to a joint venture may be the
intangibles (for example, patents, trademarks, and know-how). The joint venturer contributing these intangibles to the joint venture must be adequately advised about how to make that transfer into the joint venture, how to assure
adequate recognition by other joint venturers of the value of these contributed
intangibles, and, unfortunately but often most importantly, how to extricate
those intangibles from a disintegrating joint venture when the other joint venturer
wants to exact some additional price.
One particularly useful chapter (ch. 8, p. 83) is entitled "International Strategic Partnering-When to do it-How to make it work" by David C. Connell
of The Technology Partnership Ltd. Too often legal advisors become excessively
enmeshed in documenting a transaction and they lose sight of the client's ultimate objective: to establish a business amalgamation that is economically productive. This chapter is a useful interlude in this volume, suggesting that the
client-oriented attorney (the only surviving type of legal advisor in the increasingly competitive law practice environment) must focus with the client on how
best to exploit market opportunities, build market position, succeed through
specialization, achieve cost leadership, and, if necessary, accomplish an orderly
withdrawal from the market.
The tax chapters initially proceed from the same general perspective as do the
nontax chapters. These determine the types of legal entities appropriate for
formulating the structure of the transnationally owned joint venture. These
country-by-country discussions also focus on operational tax issues such as transfer pricing and the allocation of expenses, particularly where a third country
related company is utilized for extracting earnings from high tax jurisdictions.
Two chapters are particularly useful in providing diagrams concerning structuring alternatives: Chapter 13, "Germany-Tax Aspects of International Joint
Ventures" (p. 152), by Dr. Jirgen Killius; and Chapter 20, "United StatesSummary: Tax Issues in Organizing an International Joint Venture" (p. 246), by
Paul M. Bodner.
Because these chapters are derived from presentations at proceedings of the
International Tax Institute, much of the presentation is in an abbreviated or
outline form. These chapters are certainly not intended to exhaust the subject
matter. They are only a starting point. However, many chapters do provide a
useful summary of the important issues confronting the organization and management of an international joint venture. From this perspective this volume will
be useful. It can assist in determining the scope of examination that must be
initiated by the legal advisor in planning to structure the venture and in assuring
that the legal relationships among the joint venturers are appropriately documented.
William P. Streng
Vinson & Elkins Professor of Law
University of Houston Law Center
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Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion
of the New Law Merchant
Edited by Thomas E. Carbonneau. Ardsley-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Transnational
Publishers, Inc., 1990, pp. xxi, 227, $85.00
The concept of "lex mercatoria"-an "international" law for transnational
business-has been a fertile topic of debate in Europe during the last thirty
years.' In France Professor Berthold Goldman has nourished the debate by
stressing the role of arbitration in the generation of a distinct "legal system." In
other European countries the lex mercatoria literature has flourished more diffusely. Authors address such issues as the legal status of trade usages, the
common principles that underlie different national legal rules, and the international movement to unify private law.
By contrast, the relatively few Anglo-American authors aware of the European
debates have generally been hostile to the concept of lex mercatoria. A handful
of authors writing in English-a group that includes the late Clive Schmitthoff,
Ole Lando, Harold Berman, and Leon Trakman-have broadcast the seed on
barren soil. Only in the relatively isolated field of international commercial
arbitration has this seed germinated, but even here most English and American
authors treat the concept as a noxious weed. Some writers, such as the late Dr.
F. A. Mann, have bluntly questioned whether a lex mercatoria exists at all.
Publication of Lex Mercatoriaand Arbitrationgreatly enhances the scope and
quality of English-language commentary on the concept. Drawing upon two
excellent colloquia sponsored by the Eason-Weinmann Center for Comparative
Law at Tulane University, 2 the volume not only gives the reader access to the rich
European literature, but also adds informed insights. 3 While it gives few definitive answers to specific issues, the volume embodies the range and vitality of the
intellectual debate stimulated by analysis of the concept of lex mercatoria. Readers concerned with the private ordering of transnational business will find the
volume informative and rewarding. All academic libraries should acquire the
volume.
Twelve chapters, an Introduction, and an Afterword make up the volume. The
Introduction summarizes characteristic views of lex mercatoria by incorporating
two brief essays by Professor Goldman (pro) and Dr. Mann (con). While the
1. For a recent review of the literature described in the text, see Werner Ebke, Book Review, 21
INT'L LAW. 606 (1987).

2. Readers of this review may have read some of the volume's chapters in the Tulane Law
Review. 63 TL. L. REV. 431-709 (1989) (Smit, Highet, and Park chapters). These contributions
have, however, been carefully re-edited for this volume.
3. In the interest of full disclosure, I should reveal that I was wined and dined as a guest of the
Eason-Weinmann Center for Comparative Law at Tblane University at the second of its colloquia
incorporated in the volume reviewed here.
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authors of the subsequent chapters take up one or more of the themes in these
introductory essays, none of the authors is an acolyte. A sampling of chapter
titles suggests the broad range of notes struck by the contributors. "The 'New'
Law Merchant and the 'Old': Sources, Contents and Legitimacy" (Berman &
Dasser); "The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria and State Contracts" (Delaume); and
"The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria" (Highet). Professor Friedrich Juenger's
Afterword-which itself adds important insights-valiantly tries to pull together
themes, but the very cacophony of the contributions eludes resolution.
The hapless reviewer shares Professor Juenger's dilemma. No contribution is
unworthy of note, yet to do justice to each author would require an extensive
critique. While recognizing that each reader will find a different mix of contributions more stimulating, I have chosen to illustrate the range and vitality of the
volume with brief reviews of only four chapters.
M. Georges Delaume's contribution is a devastating critique of those writers
who cite the language of state contracts as evidence of the existence of a lex
mercatoria. M. Delaume reviews current practice with respect to modem state
contracts. He concludes (pp. 96-98) not only that this practice is rooted in
traditional conflict of laws analysis, but also that changing world conditions
make a lex mercatoria unnecessary.
By contrast, Professor Bernard Audit's study of transnational sales contracts
looks not to current practice, but to the hierarchy of norms recognized by the
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Equating lex
mercatoria with trade usages and party autonomy, Professor Audit concludes
(pp. 141-43, 159-60) that the Convention complements, rather than contradicts, an existing lex mercatoria composed of custom and contract practices.
To Professor Audit's more abstract analysis, Professor Andreas Lowenfeld
adds the flesh of illustrations drawn from his experience as an arbitrator. In
practice, Professor Lowenfeld writes, arbitrators do occasionally refer to "general commercial law." In the examples he gives, arbitrators first identify the
relevant legal rule using traditional choice-of-law analysis. If the rule is inappropriate for the transaction before them, however, the arbitrators will derive an
appropriate "general commercial rule" by a comparison of national laws and
(possibly) from international conventions. These general rules, in other words,
play the limited, but useful role of negating what Ernst Rabel once called "the
5
awesome relics from the dead past" found in some national laws.
Professor Ference Madl of Hungary also assumes that there is a general commercial law, but his is a more eclectic and positivist conception. The major
4. M. Dulaume quotes (p. 83), for example, the language of a typical early state concession
contract:
The Concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the principles of law of Libya common
to the principles of international law and in the absence of such common principles, then by and in accordance with
the general principles of law, including such of those principles as may have been applied in international tribunals.

5. Ernst Rabel, The Hague Conference on the Unificationof Sales Law, 1AM. J. COMP. L. 58,
61 (1952) (speaking of national sales laws).
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component of the lex mercatoria, according to his view, is the body of international conventions, such as the U.N. Sales Convention, that have become law by
state action. With this emphasis in mind, Professor (now Minister without Portfolio) Madl demonstrates the extent to which Hungary had already become
integrated into the more general international economic order before the cataclysmic events of 1989.
Given how different Professor Madl's conception of the lex mercatoria is from
that of Professor Lowenfeld or even from that of Professor Audit, one wishes that
the volume incorporated a more open debate or interchange between the contributors. Is there, in fact, a common core of meaning one can give the concept
of lex mercatoria?
The authors disagree, however, not only about what the lex mercatoria is, but
also about what constitutes current practice. How often, for example, do parties
to transnational contracts fail to designate the law they wish to govern their
contract? Answers differ. Dr. Mann states (p. xix) that it is "increasingly rare"
for parties not to choose the applicable law and, given his assumption that
arbitrators will abide by the parties' choice, he intimates that the debate about lex
mercatoria deals with relatively few transactions. Professor Lowenfeld, on the
other hand, states (p. 53) that "agreements without a choice of law clause are
common in my experience." More cautiously, Professor William Park observes
(p. 113) that "[t]he variety of choice of law clauses found in international contracts makes it difficult to generalize."
Consider also the question of what legal rules business enterprises expect will
govern their disputes when they choose to arbitrate. Professor Thomas Carbonneau suggests (p. 13) that when enterprises refer a dispute to arbitration they
assume that arbitrators will temper references to national law with principles
appropriate for transnational trade. He writes (p. 13): "Arguably, when arbitrators modify the governing municipal law by referring to the lex mercatoria, they
disappoint party expectations. Such references, however, now appear to be part
of the bargain associated with the agreement to submit disputes to international
arbitration." Professor Lowenfeld expressly agrees (p. 56), while several other
contributors implicitly concur.
Dr. Mann, on the other hand, emphatically disagrees (p. xxi): "It may be
suggested with confidence that no merchant of any experience would ever be
prepared to submit to the unforeseeable consequences which arise from the
application of undefined and undefinable standards described as rules of a lex of
unknown origin." Professor Park, who stresses (pp. 115-18) that business enterprises seek to make their legal obligations certain so that risks are predictable,
presumably concurs with Dr. Mann.
Although no empirical evidence is cited to support these assumptions, Professor Lowenfeld does provide limited anecdotal evidence taken from arbitration
cases on which he has sat as an arbitrator. To collect evidence of current practice
is obviously very difficult. As Professor Carbonneau laments (p. 5), "[t]he
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private, ad hoc character of arbitration makes it difficult to formulate an informed
and comprehensive evaluation." "No one," he adds (p. 5, n.22), "can ever be
quite sure of what actually happens because the proceedings and determinations
are hidden from public scrutiny." If this difficulty is acknowledged for the
arbitral proceedings themselves, consider how much more difficult it is to collect
evidence of party expectations and practices that leave no traces in official
records.
Yet these empirical assumptions are often vital to the authors' analyses, and it
is unsettling to discover how often the authors fail to acknowledge the significance of their assumptions. This is all the more disturbing when an author then
slips the assumption into normative conclusions. If one accepts, for example, the
norm that decisionmakers should enforce the parties' expectations, then one
should not object when arbitrators apply the lex mercatoria where parties, by
choosing arbitration, expect the arbitrators to do so. This appears to be Professor
Carbonneau's position (pp. 10-13). It rests, however, on an untested assumption about party expectations.
To ask for greater care when using empirical assumptions is one thing. To ask
for the empirical studies themselves, however, is to ask for another book. Perhaps Professor Carbonneau, who so ably edited this volume and who is now the
director of the Eason-Weinmann Center, will use the Center's resources to carry
out and publish relevant empirical research.
Peter Winship
James Cleo Thompson Sr. Trustee Professor of Law
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas
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